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This paper examines how considering firm-level innovation in carbon-abatement 
technologies influences the optimal design choice for carbon pricing. It builds on 
Weitzman’s model (1974) that shows in what instances cap and trade, and in what 
instances a carbon tax is the best policy instrument in the presence of uncertainty. 
We show that if the model is expanded to also reflect the choice of firms to invest in 
innovation, then the benefits and preferred application of cap-and-trade schemes 
increases. In 1976, Roberts and Spence showed that a hybrid cap-and-trade 
scheme with price floor and ceiling is preferable to pure tax or cap-and-trade 
schemes. We show how expanding the framework to incorporate innovation 
incentives results in an upward shift of the price ceiling in the case of steep damage 
cost curves. 
 
The paper shows how the original results of the simple model that is often quoted by 
economists can be altered by the inclusion of additional aspects. This highlights the 
importance of considering further economic aspects, such as risk aversion of 
investors, but also political considerations, such as the increased potential for 
political lobbying where policy instruments have more design parameters.  
 
Given the very limited scope of the analysis of this paper, we do not propose a 
specific choice of policy instruments, such as cap-and-trade, or carbon tax, but 
rather suggest that it is important to consider innovation incentives in the design of 
such schemes. This allows for a commitment to more ambitious emission reductions, 
reflected in tighter emission caps. As the paper further shows, the equilibrium carbon 
price, reflecting the cost of the marginal mitigation technology, should be above the 
marginal damage cost at the respective emission level. This creates 
additional incentives and opportunities for innovative low-carbon 
technologies, thus reducing overall mitigation cost.       
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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of firm-level innovation in carbon-abatement
technologies on optimal cap-and-trade schemes with and without price controls.
We characterize optimal cap-and-trade regulation with price cap and price floor,
and compare it to the special cases of pure taxation and simple emissions cap. In-
novation shifts the tradeoff between price- and quantity-based instruments towards
quantity-based emissions trading schemes. More specifically, an increase in inno-
vation effectiveness lowers the optimal emissions cap, and leads to relaxed price
controls unless the slope of the marginal environmental damage cost curve is small.
Because of the decrease in the emissions cap, innovation in abatement technologies
can lead to a higher expected carbon price, so as to provide sufficient incentives
for private R&D investments. The expected carbon price decreases once innovative
technologies are widely used.
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1 Introduction
In order to bound global warming, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) noted that worldwide annual carbon emissions need to be cut approximately
in half by 2050 (IPCC 2008). A mix of different policy instruments is likely to be required
to deliver the necessary emissions reductions, including a price for carbon, incentives
for technological innovation, and suitable administrative procedures (Stern 2007). We
focus on the role of a carbon price, and explore the role of price- and quantity-control
instruments on mitigation efforts and investment in improvement of emissions-abatement
technologies. We first characterize optimal cap-and-trade schemes with price controls (of
which pure taxation and standard cap-and-trade are special cases) and then examine how
a change in innovation effectiveness influences the design of carbon markets. We find
that an increase in innovation effectiveness can counter-intuitively lead to higher carbon
prices, which stems from the fact that in order to encourage technological innovation, the
welfare-maximizing regulator may opt to aggressively decrease the emissions cap, leading
to a higher expected carbon price despite the anticipated decrease in abatement cost.
Because of the increased importance of the emissions cap as a policy instrument, more
innovation tends to favor quantity-based instruments over price-based instruments such
as taxes: unless the slope of the marginal environmental damage cost curve is small (and
an inverse result obtains), an increase in innovation effectiveness will lead to looser price
controls (i.e., lower price floor and higher price cap), tipping the scales more towards a
quantity-control scheme.
There are three main reasons for a simultaneous consideration of several regulatory
instruments.1 First, a joint optimization of several instruments (prices and quanti-
ties) cannot do worse than optimizing any policy instrument individually (Roberts and
Spence 1976; Weitzman 1978). Second, analysis focusing on economic impacts, and ab-
stracting from the political economy of implementation policy instruments, shows that
no single policy instrument clearly dominates the others (Fullerton 2001; Nordhaus 2007;
Goulder and Parry 2008). Third, the regulatory policy needs to influence multiple de-
cisions, in our case, the capital investment in innovation, and the decision about the
1There are also reasons against hybrid cap-and-trade markets, such as the increased design complexity,
commitment problems, political influence activities (e.g., price controls are subject to significant lobbying
activities, as are already the number of emissions permits as well as the mode of the initial permit
allocation), and increased risk of incompatibilities of different designs across countries (cf. Section 4).
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emissions output. In terms of results, we characterize the optimal policy, a cap-and-trade
scheme with price controls (in the form of price cap and price floor), and contrast it to the
classical schemes of pure taxation and cap-and-trade without price controls, with respect
to performance and the firms’ incentives to abate and innovate. Tight price controls limit
the firms’ exposure to risk on the carbon market due to macroeconomic risk and uncer-
tainty resulting from the random return to the firms’ R&D investment. However, they
also lead to variability in aggregate emissions and thus increase the volatility of environ-
mental damages. The latter because of their convexity in aggregate emissions lead (via
Jensen’s inequality) to higher expected damages. While the firms’ innovation becomes
more effective, it is always optimal to set a more ambitious, lower emissions cap, optimal
price controls tighten only when the slope of the marginal environmental damage cost
curve (per unit of emissions output) is small. When the slope of marginal environmental
damages is large, then it is best for a regulator to relax price controls in response to an
increase in the firms’ innovation effectiveness. While at first glance this appears to be a
contradiction to Weitzman’s (1974) seminal analysis of ‘prices vs. quantities,’ which pre-
dicts – in the absence of innovation – less stringent price controls as a consequence of an
increase in marginal environmental damages, the same tradeoff prevails at any fixed level
of innovation effectiveness. This, together with the fact that price controls are relaxed
(in the sense that price floor decreases and price cap increases) when innovation effective-
ness increases and environmental damages are large, implies that the sensitivity of the
price controls increases substantially as innovation becomes an important factor. This
increased sensitivity underlines the necessity to jointly consider all available instruments,
as welfare losses are compounded in the presence of additional uncertainty, e.g., in terms
of macroeconomic conditions, innovation costs, or environmental damages.
1.1 Related Literature
Ever since Tyndall’s (1861) empirical investigations about the interaction of gases with
radiation and concomitant absorption of heat, and Arrhenius’ (1898) theoretical model of
the greenhouse effect, the question of global warming, in terms of its causes, description,
mitigation of its effects, and projection of resulting scenarios, has been on the modern
research agenda. A consensus emerged that carbon emissions by man’s economic activity
and climate change are intertwined, and have to be addressed simultaneously (see, e.g.,
Nordhaus (1977)). The economic activity considered here includes two decisions taken by
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firms: first, how much carbon (dioxide) to emit (‘emissions control’), and, second, how
much to invest in an improvement (‘innovation’) of carbon-abatement technologies.
Emissions Control. Pigouvian taxation (Pigou 1920) was initially viewed as the most
straightforward way to price the social cost of firms’ emissions output, since unlike other
distortionary taxation on a firm’s inputs, which usually lead to significant deadweight
losses (Ballard et al. 1985), a carbon tax corrects a distortion generated by the lack of
a price for the expected environmental damages through carbon (or ‘carbon-equivalent’)
emissions (Pearce 1991). An alternative course of action for governments, namely to
issue tradable emissions permits, was suggested already by Coase (1960) and further
developed by Crocker (1966), Dales (1968), and Montgomery (1972). Such quantity-
based regulation is sometimes viewed as inferior on the grounds of significant transaction
costs (Stavins 1995), given that an administrative system for levying tax is usually avail-
able. In the absence of transaction-cost considerations, the optimal choice between tax or
quantity-based allowance-trading scheme depends on the nature of the uncertainty (Weitz-
man 1974):2 since environmental damages are typically modelled as a convex function of
the aggregate emissions output, an increase in risk (Rothchild and Stiglitz 1971) increases
expected damages (as a consequence of Jensen’s inequality), which in turn favors quantity-
based regulation. If, on the other hand, the loss in society’s payoffs due to uncertainty in
emissions output and resulting expected environmental damages are small compared to
the loss due to randomness in market prices, then an emissions tax is preferred, as it elimi-
nates price uncertainty. Naturally, as Weitzman (1978) shows, a combination of price and
quantity regulation cannot do worse than either policy instrument alone. In Weitzman’s
treatment a price-quota system determines a socially optimal reward as a function of its
emissions output for each participating firm. In actual real-world settings, it is impossible
to implement such infinite-dimensional policies (in the form of reward functions) using
simple cap-and-trade. Yet, a first approximation, which still combines the features of pure
taxation and a simple cap-and-trade system, is a market for emissions allowances with
price controls: an emissions cap controls total emissions and determines the initial num-
2Various generalizations of Weitzman’s (1974) analysis have been proposed, such as for situations with
asymmetric information between regulator and firms (Laffont 1977; Hoel and Karp 2002), correlated
uncertainty (Stavins 1996), hybrid price-quantity controls (Roberts and Spence 1976; Weitzman 1978),
incomplete enforcement (Montero 2002), and bankable permits (Fell et al. 2008).
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ber of permits to be issued. As long as the resulting market price for emissions is within
pre-specified price bounds, this results in a normal cap-and-trade system. If the carbon
price reaches the pre-specified maximum price (price cap), additional permits are issued
(Roberts and Spence 1976; McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002; Pizer 2002). The price floor
can be implemented with a reservation price for allowance auctions (Hepburn et al. 2006),
by governments issuing option contracts on the carbon price (Ismer and Neuhoff 2006) as
a commitment to buy back permits as the carbon price drops below the price floor. More
recently, Philibert (2008) uses extensive Monte-Carlo simulations to study the effect of
price caps and price floors on climate policy. The simulation results confirm that price
controls, while increasing expected environmental damage, dampen expected aggregate
abatement cost. To this we add a simplified formal framework and an analysis of the
interaction with innovation.
Technological Innovation. The introduction of a carbon price via incentive-based
emissions-control policies is, according to Hicks’ (1932, p. 132) ‘induced invention hy-
pothesis,’ likely to affect the rate and path of technological change. This hypothesis
sparked not only a stream of research attempting to formally establish this effect in
general-equilibrium models (Kennedy 1964; von Weisza¨cker 1965), but also several severe
criticisms related to the description of knowledge accumulation (Samuelson 1965; Nord-
haus 1973), producing a hiatus of results. More recently, research on technology-induced
innovation has seen renewed efforts, particularly in the context of carbon-abatement tech-
nologies (Goulder and Mathai 2000; Goulder and Schneider 1999; Sue Wing 2003). For
a recent survey on technological change in economic models of environmental policy, see
Lo¨schel (2002) and Edenhofer et al. (2006), who emphasize the need to consider innovation
as an endogenous decision variable rather than an exogenous process. With the aid of sim-
ulations in a computational general-equilibrium model, Goulder and Mathai (1999) show
that a carbon tax may stimulate R&D and technological progress in both carbon-using
and carbon-competing industries. Goulder and Mathai (2000) demonstrate analytically
that induced technological change leads to a lower carbon tax. Our findings, which are
obtained in a somewhat different setting, where firms can fully appropriate rents to in-
novation, only partially confirm this finding. When the intensity (or ‘effectiveness’) of
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innovation is large, then in our model a decrease in tax is an optimal response.3 Yet,
for relatively small induced technological change, which corresponds to fairly realistic
model calibration, it may be optimal to increase taxes as a response to an increase in
innovation effectiveness. More generally, in a hybrid cap-and-trade scheme with quan-
tity controls, an increase in innovation effectiveness can lead to either a tightening of the
price band (for low marginal environmental damages) or a widening of the price band
(for high marginal environmental damages). Margolis and Kammen (1999) point out that
investments in R&D in the U.S. energy sector are low when compared to other sectors,
somewhat corroborating the possibility that innovation effectiveness may still be low for
carbon-abatement technologies.
1.2 Outline
The paper is organized as follows. After introducing the basic model in Section 2, we
characterize, in Section 3, optimal regulatory approaches and their respective responses
to increases in innovation effectiveness. Policy implications are discussed in Section 4,
and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a unit mass of firms, indexed by θ ∈ Θ ⊂ R++, and distributed on the
(measurable) type space Θ with the cumulative distribution function (cdf) F : Θ→ [0, 1],
so that the mean
µ =
∫
Θ
θdF (θ)
and the variance
σ2θ =
∫
Θ
(θ − µ)2dF (θ)
both exist and are finite. The model timing consists of three time periods (stages), indexed
by t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. At time t = 0 (regulation stage), a regulator commits to a regulatory
policy R = (E,L, U), by announcing an emissions cap E, a price floor L, and a price
cap U . In particular, the regulator may choose pure taxation or a cap-and-trade scheme
3Hart (2008) examines the intertemporal use of carbon taxes in the presence of technological spillovers.
He shows that a regulator may find it optimal to set taxes above the Pigouvian level of marginal envi-
ronmental damages in order to provide a sufficiently large incentive to innovate.
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without price controls.4 At time t = 1 (innovation stage), any firm has the option to in-
vest in innovation, which may reduce its cost of carbon abatement in the future. Finally,
at time t = 2 (implementation stage), each firm θ ∈ Θ chooses its carbon emissions level.
We now describe each of the three stages in detail, starting with the last.
Implementation Stage (t = 2). Without any price on carbon or other output restrictions,
firm θ expects to produce its business-as-usual (BAU) carbon emissions output of e0(θ).
The actual BAU carbon emissions for firm θ are subject to a macroeconomic random
shock ε˜. The latter is common to all firms and has cdf G : R → [0, 1], with Eε˜ = 0
and 0 < Eε˜2 = σ2ε < ∞.5 Given a realized BAU carbon emissions level eˆ0 = e0(θ) + ε,
firm θ’s cost of abating its carbon emissions to a level e ≤ eˆ0 is
C(e, ρˆθ|eˆ0) = (eˆ0 − e)
2
2ρˆθ
, (1)
where ρˆ ≥ 1 denotes the outcome of the firm’s investment in the preceding innovation
stage, further detailed below. All else being equal, the larger the firm’s type θ, the smaller
its marginal abatement cost (eˆ0 − e)/(ρˆθ).6 Given a price p for each unit of carbon
emissions (typically measured in tCO2eq, i.e., tons of ‘carbon-dioxide equivalent,’
7 and
here denoted by tCO2 for simplicity), the firm’s total cost of producing at the emissions
4In Section 3, these important special cases are examined separately.
5It is possible to allow for independent firm-specific (idiosyncratic) zero-mean random shocks ε˜(θ) with
finite variances σ2ε(θ) > 0, satisfying the Lindeberg condition
∫
Θ
E
[
ε˜2(θ)/σ2ε(θ)
∣∣ |ε˜(θ)| > δσε(θ)] dF (θ) =
0 for all δ > 0, which complicates the presentation and leads to an equivalent result. By the central limit
theorem, the macroeconomic shock ε˜ then corresponds to the limiting zero-mean normal distribution
with standard deviation σε =
∫
Θ
σε(θ)dF (θ).
6The affine form of the marginal abatement cost is chosen as in Weitzman (1978) so as to obtain explicit
model results. More generally, marginal abatement costs are convex and decrease to zero as the emissions
level approaches the firm’s BAU level (Misfeldt and Hauff 2004). Enkvist et al. (2007) use data to find an
approximately affine marginal abatement-cost curve. They also note that marginal abatement cost may
become negative for small levels of abatement, as small emissions improvements could be implemented at
a gain to a firm. In our model we assume that all such gains have been internalized, so that the marginal
abatement cost at the firm’s realized BAU emissions level vanishes.
7One ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (denoted by tCO2eq) is the weight of a greenhouse gas which
would have the same time-integrated radiative forcing (over a period of 100 years) as one ton of CO2. The
term radiative forcing, as used by the IPCC, refers to the perturbation of the surface-troposphere system
after introduction of a chemical agent, e.g., as a result of a change in greenhouse-gas concentrations. A
related measure, equivalent carbon dioxide (CO2e), is the concentration of CO2 that would generate the
same level of radiative forcing as a given type of greenhouse gas. The unit of CO2e is parts per million per
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level e is
TC(e, p, ρˆθ|eˆ0) = C(e, ρˆθ|eˆ0) + pe.
The firm’s optimal emissions output minimizes its total cost, and is uniquely determined
by8
e∗(p, ρˆθ|eˆ0) = eˆ0 − ρˆθp. (2)
At this output level, the firm’s optimal total carbon emissions cost is
TC∗(p, ρˆθ|eˆ0) = eˆ0p− ρˆθp
2
2
.
Innovation Stage (t = 1). Given the announcement of a carbon pricing policy, each firm θ
chooses the level y of innovative activity. The cost of pursuing the innovative activity
K(y) is known, but the outcome of the innovation ρ˜(y) is uncertain. The innovation
provides an advantage over the existing technology if and only if ρ˜(y) > 1. Only in this
case will it be utilized. We assume that the expected outcome of innovation for a certain
level of innovative activity y is:9
y = E [max{ρ˜(y), 1}| y]− 1 ≥ 0. (3)
Firm θ’s expected net payoff from innovating is
pi(p, y, θ) =
θyp2
2
−K(y).
Assuming that K(y) is a continuously differentiable, convex, and increasing function (sat-
isfying the Inada conditions K(0) = K ′(0) = 0 and K ′(∞) =∞), the optimal innovation
is determined by the first-order optimality condition θp2/2 = K ′(y). If we assume, for the
sake of discussion, that
K(y) = cy2/2,
volume (ppmv). CO2eq is therefore a time-integrated version of CO2e and measures the ‘global warming
potential’ of a given amount of greenhouse gas emissions.
8In principle it is possible to obtain negative values for optimal carbon emissions, which implies that
the firm would further substitute its production away from carbon than its zero-carbon emissions normal-
ization would indicate. Alternatively, the firm can accumulate carbon credits. The unconstrained opti-
mization also simplifies the model in that the expected level of aggregate emissions with macroeconomic
uncertainty corresponds to the aggregate emissions level in the absence of this uncertainty (‘certainty
equivalence’). Relaxing this condition would influence modeling results only marginally, and would also
raise the additional question of the precise measurement of the absolute level of BAU emissions.
9This is without any loss in generality, as for any arbitrary parametrization of the innovative pro-
cess ρ˜(x) in terms of x, one can simply set y equal to v(x) ≡ E [max{ρ˜(x), 1}|x]− 1 and then reparame-
terize the innovative process in terms of xˆ = (xˆ0, x) which contains xˆ0 = y = v(x) as one component.
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where c is a positive constant, firm θ’s optimal innovation becomes
y∗(p, θ) =
θp2
2c
, (4)
resulting in an expected net payoff of
pi∗(p, θ) =
θ2p4
8c
. (5)
Thus, the benefits of improving abatement technologies are highly sensitive to the carbon
price. Nonetheless, the expected payoff of optimal innovation is positive, as long as small
improvements are cheap (since K ′(0) = 0).10
Regulation Stage (t = 0). The regulator commits to a (deterministic) regulatory policy
R = (E,L, U),
consisting of an emissions cap E (implemented by issuing a set quantity of emissions
permits), and a price interval [L,U ] for the secondary market in emissions permits. In
the event the market price p reaches the price floor L, the regulator offers firms to buy
back emissions permits at the price L. If the market price p reaches the price cap U , the
regulator offers firms additional permits at the price U .
Remark 1 (i) A pure carbon tax τ can be implemented by choosing R = (E, τ, τ),
where E ≥ 0 is arbitrary, since the carbon market is bypassed by the regulator, who
offers an ex-ante unlimited number of carbon emissions permits at the fixed price of τ .
(ii) A pure carbon emissions cap of E is also a special case, which can be implemented
by setting R = (E, 0,∞), effectively disabling the price controls with L = 0 and U =∞.
The set of feasible regulatory policies is
R = {(E,L, U) ∈ R3+ : L ≤ U} .
To formulate the regulator’s problem, we first aggregate the firms’ expected emissions at
a given carbon price p, which yields (using Eqs. (2)–(4)) the expected aggregate carbon
emissions output
Q(p, ε) =
∫
Θ
e∗(p, (1 + y∗(p, θ))θ|e0(θ) + ε)dF (θ) = e0 + ε− µp− µ
2 + σ2θ
2c
p3, (6)
10Enkvist et al. (2007) argue that the cost of abating the first units of carbon emissions, net of benefits,
may on average be negative. The assumption that K ′(0) = 0 implies that any firm’s BAU emissions are
set to the level at which it has internalized any such abatement benefits.
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where we denote by
e0 =
∫
Θ
e0(θ)dF (θ)
the expected aggregate BAU emissions output in the economy. To understand the integral
in Eq. (6) note first that by Eq. (3) a firm of cost type θ, when investing in technology at
the optimal innovation level y∗(p, θ), expects to transition to the improved cost type θˆ =
(1+y∗(p, θ))θ. Substituting Eqs. (2) and (4) in the integrand, the right-hand side of Eq. (6)
obtains via straightforward integration. At the aggregate emissions level Q, environmental
damages are given by
D(Q) =
dQ2
2
,
where d denotes the slope of the marginal environmental damage cost curve.11 The
expected environmental damages are therefore
D¯(R) = E [D (Q(p˜, ε˜))|H(p˜, ε˜, R) = 0] , (7)
where the measure of the stochastic price p˜ is determined by the market-clearing condi-
tion 12
H(p, ε, R) ≡ (U − p)(p− L)(E −Q(p, ε)) = 0. (8)
Insofar as the regulatory policy R influences aggregate emissions, it also controls the level
of expected environmental damages. The expected aggregate cost of carbon abatement
at the policy R is
C¯(R) = E
[
C
(
e∗(p˜, (1 + y∗(p˜, θ˜))θ˜|e0 + ε˜), (1 + y∗(p˜, θ˜))θ˜
∣∣∣ e0 + ε˜)∣∣∣H(p˜, ε˜, R) = 0] , (9)
where the optimal emissions e∗ are given in Eq. (2) and optimal innovation is determined
by Eq. (4). The firms’ expected aggregate social cost of innovation K¯(R) of the policy R
is
K¯(R) = λE
[
K(y∗(p˜, θ˜))
∣∣∣H(p˜, ε˜, R) = 0] , (10)
where the constant λ ∈ [0, 1] describes how much society (i.e., the regulator) cares about
these costs. The reason why one would expect generally that λ < 1 is that firms are
able to appropriate a portion of the innovation payoffs in the form of intellectual property
11A quadratic form for environmental damages is widely used in the literature (see, e.g., Baumol and
Oates (1988)). Such quadratic damages seem more realistic, especially in light of nonlinear threshold
effects for high CO2 concentrations, than the often assumed linear form (see, e.g., Tol 2005).
12For the measure of p˜ to be determined by the condition H(p˜, ε˜, R) = 0 it is, by the inverse function
theorem, enough to assume that ∂H(p, ε,R)/∂p exists and is nonzero almost everywhere.
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rights (on top of the abatement-cost savings), resulting in private benefits, e.g., through
international technology licensing or savings in future unmodelled periods, that offset the
innovation cost to society at least in part.13
The Regulatory Problem. An optimal regulatory policy R∗ maximizes expected wel-
fare W¯ (R) (or, equivalently, minimizes total expected social cost SC(R) ≡ −W¯ (R)),
W¯ (R) = −C¯(R)− D¯(R)− K¯(R), (11)
i.e., it is such that
R∗ ∈ argmax
R∈R
W¯ (R).
The main notation relevant for the model is summarized in Table 1.
3 Optimal Regulation
Common regulatory schemes include pure carbon taxation, cap-and-trade markets with-
out price controls, and cap-and-trade markets with price controls as a generalization which
includes the first two. Here we examine all three regulatory schemes. In doing this, we
parameterize the firms’ ‘innovation effectiveness’ by β ≥ 0 and examine the effect of inno-
vation as β increases, in particular over the ‘base case’ without innovation (when β = 0).
Such increases could come about exogenously as a result of government sponsorship, or
endogenously through ‘learning by doing’ with private investment in R&D, which tends
to generate further technological possibilities (Grubb 1997).
To compute the regulator’s objective function (expected total welfare W¯ ), we first
determine the price p(ε,R) of carbon using the market-clearing condition (8) as a function
of the macroeconomic shock ε and the regulatory policy R = (E,L, U), which yields
p(ε,R) =

U, if ε ≥ ε¯(E,U),
L, if ε ≤ ε
¯
(E,L),
p0(ε, E)−∆(p0(ε, E), β), otherwise,
(12)
13In addition, society may be able to obtain a “double dividend” from the revenues generated by the
sale of the carbon permits (Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994; Carraro et al. 1996). For simplicity, we assume
that the double dividend is zero.
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Symbol Description Unit
c Marginal cost of innovation $
d Slope of marginal environmental damage cost $/(tCO2)2
e∗(p, θ) Firm θ’s carbon emissions output at price p tCO2
e0 Aggregate BAU emissions output tCO2
p, p0 Carbon price, with and without innovation $/(tCO2)
y∗(p, θ) Firm θ’s innovative activity at price p N/A
C¯(R) Expected aggregate abatement cost $
D¯(R) Expected aggregate environmental damage cost $
K¯(R) Expected social cost of innovation $
E Emissions cap tCO2
L Price floor $/(tCO2)
Q(p, ε) Aggregate carbon emissions level at (p, ε) tCO2
R Regulatory policy, R = (E,L,U) ∈ R ⊂ R3+ [(E,L,U)]
U Price cap $/(tCO2)
W¯ (R) Expected aggregate social welfare $
β Innovation effectiveness (tCO2)2/$2
ε Macroeconomic uncertainty tCO2
λ Regulator’s weight on firms’ aggregate profit in W¯ N/A
θ Cost type in type space Θ ⊂ R++ (tCO2)2/$
τ Carbon tax $/(tCO2)
Table 1: Summary of Notation.
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where
p0(ε, E) = (e0 + ε− E)/µ (13)
is the market price for carbon without innovation, and
ε¯(E,U) = µU(1 + βU2)− (e0 − E), (14)
ε
¯
(E,L) = µL(1 + βL2)− (e0 − E) (15)
are the upper and lower thresholds for BAU emissions realizations that trigger price
controls. The perturbation term in Eq. (12),
∆(p0, β) = 2µA
−1/3 − A
1/3
6β
+ p0, (16)
with A = 12µβ2
(
9p0 +
√
3
√
(4µ3/β) + 27p20
)
, is nonnegative and increasing in the inno-
vation effectiveness
β =
µ2 + σ2θ
2µc
. (17)
The innovation effectiveness increases when the innovation cost c decreases, or when
the first (µ) or second (σ2θ) moment of the firms’ type distribution F increases. When
innovation becomes prohibitively expensive (so that c → ∞), then β vanishes and con-
sequently ∆(p0, 0) = 0. The expected social welfare W¯ as a function of R in Eq. (11) is
obtained by substituting the market price p(ε,R) in Eqs. (7), (9), and (10), leading to
C¯(R) =
µ
2
∫ ∞
−∞
(
1 + βp2(ε,R)
)
p2(ε,R) dG(ε), (18)
D¯(R) =
d
2
∫ ∞
−∞
(
e0 + ε− µp(ε,R)
(
1 + βp2(ε,R)
))2
dG(ε), (19)
K¯(R) =
λµ
4
∫ ∞
−∞
βp4(ε,R)dG(ε). (20)
3.1 Pure Taxation
Consider first a restriction of feasible policies to imposing a carbon tax τ ≥ 0, which is
equivalent to fixing a price in a carbon market by setting L = U = τ and issuing an
arbitrary number of permits, e.g., E = e0. In that case, R = (e0, τ, τ) and p(ε,R) ≡ τ .
Proposition 1 (Optimal Tax) For any β ≥ 0, let τ ∗(β) be the optimal carbon tax.
(i) In the absence of innovation, i.e., when β = 0, the optimal tax is
τ ∗(0) =
de0
1 + µd
≡ τ ∗0 .
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(ii) The optimal tax τ ∗(β) decreases (in a neighborhood of β > 0) if and only if
µd > (1− λ)/(1 + 3βτ 2)2∣∣
τ=τ∗(β) .
(iii) For β →∞, the optimal tax vanishes, i.e., it is τ ∗(∞) = 0.
Part (i) implies that the optimal social welfare without innovation is
W¯ ∗0,Tax = −
µde20
1 + µd
− dσ
2
ε
2
.
The maximum tax τ ∗max = maxβ≥0 τ
∗(β) follows directly from part (ii) when the inequality
is either replaced by an equality or satisfied everywhere (in which case τ ∗0 is maximal), so
that
τ ∗max =

τ ∗0 , if µd ≥ 1− λ,√
1
3βm
[√
1−λ
µd
− 1
]
+
, otherwise;
it is imposed where β = βm ≡ inf
{
βˆ ≥ 0 : µd ≥ (1− λ)/(1 + 3βˆτ 2)2
∣∣∣
τ=τ∗(βˆ)
}
. The fact
that the optimal carbon tax is (as long as λ < 1) generally nonmonotonic in innovation
effectiveness, as shown in Figure 1, is noteworthy. Indeed, if environmental damages are
‘small,’ so that µd < 1 − λ, then it is optimal for a regulator to first increase taxes
as innovation starts to become feasible (i.e., for small β). The intuition is that higher
taxes lead to increased incentives to innovate and thus imply more ambitious emissions
targets. The regulator is more likely to increase taxes as a response to increases in β, the
larger 1/µ (corresponding, roughly, to the average marginal abatement cost) and the larger
the weight on the firms’ aggregate profits in the expected social welfare. As innovation
becomes more and more effective, the regulator can decrease taxes, since firms will tend
to fully abate their emissions, even when the carbon tax is low. If the regulator considers
all of the innovation cost as social cost, so that λ = 1, the optimal tax is decreasing in
the innovation effectiveness β.
Example 1 Consider an economy where the firms’ marginal cost types are distributed
such that µ = 33 · 106 (tCO2)2/$2, σθ = 3.3 · 106 (tCO2)2/$2, the innovation-cost coef-
ficient is c = $100 · 109/(unit of relative improvement), and the environmental damage
function is characterized by d = $3.3 · 10−9/(tCO2)2. Then for an annual aggregate
BAU emissions level of e0 = 13.5 · 109 tCO2, corresponding to the combined OECD
emissions output (IEA 2008), we obtain that τ ∗0 ≈ $40/(tCO2). Furthermore, with a
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Figure 1: Optimal Carbon Tax as a Function of β and d (for 0 ≤ λ < 1).
resulting innovation effectiveness of β ≈ 0.167 · 10−3 (tCO2)2/$2, the optimal carbon tax
(determined numerically) is τ ∗(β) ≈ $46/(tCO2) increases by about 13% over its level
without innovation, for λ = 0. If the regulator considers the innovation cost as social
expenses, i.e., when λ = 1, the optimal carbon tax drops to τ ∗(β) ≈ $39/(tCO2). The
resulting expected aggregate emissions are Q¯∗0 ≈ 12.17 · 109 tCO2 without innovation,
and Q¯∗(β) ≈ 12.0 · 109 tCO2 for λ = 0 (resp. Q¯∗(β) ≈ 12.21 · 109 tCO2 for λ = 1) with
innovation. ¤
3.2 Basic Cap-and-Trade (without Price Controls)
We now consider the special case where the regulator chooses a “basic” cap-and-trade
scheme without binding price bounds, by setting L = 0 and U = ∞. Then the market
price for carbon depends only on the emissions cap E and the realization of the macroe-
conomic uncertainty ε, i.e., p = p(ε, E) = p0(ε, E) −∆(p0(ε, E), β). It is determined by
the market-clearing condition (8), which can be written in the form
p0(ε, E)− p(ε, E)− βp3(ε, E) = 0. (21)
Proposition 2 (Optimal Emissions Cap) For any β ≥ 0, let E∗(β) be the optimal
emissions cap in the absence of price controls.
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(i) In the absence of innovation, i.e., when β = 0, the optimal emissions cap is
E∗(0) =
e0
1 + µd
≡ E∗0 .
(ii) As the firms’ innovation effectiveness β increases, the optimal emissions cap E∗(β)
decreases.
(iii) For β →∞, the optimal emissions cap vanishes, i.e., E∗(∞) = 0.
In the absence of innovation, Eq. (13) and part (i) of Propositon 1 imply that the expected
price is the same as the optimal tax without innovation computed in the previous section,
p¯∗0 = E [p0(ε˜, E∗0)|E∗0 ] = (e0 − E∗0)/µ = τ ∗0 . (22)
The corresponding optimal expected social welfare is
W¯ ∗0,Basic C&T = −
µde20
1 + µd
− σ
2
ε
2µ
.
Part (ii) of Proposition 2 characterizes the behavior of the solution in β. Since this paper
provides several such monotone comparative statics results, we provide the proof intuition.
The proofs of other such results (cf. Proposition 1 (ii) and Proposition 4 (ii),(iii)) follow
along similar lines. Via implicit differentiation of the market-clearing condition (21),
we obtain that pE, pβ < 0 < pβE (see Eqs. (24)–(26) in the Appendix for the exact
expressions), where subscripts denote partial derivatives. That is, when the carbon market
clears, the market price p decreases in the emissions cap E and innovation effectiveness β;
it also exhibits increasing differences in (β,E), which means that the price decrease in E
(resp. β) is moderated when β (resp. E) increases. Furthermore, since p is nonnegative
and decreasing in both β and E, any (positive integer) power of p also has increasing
differences in (β,E). Using the previous relations, expected abatement cost C¯ can easily
be shown to have increasing differences in (β,E), while D¯ does not depend on β for
a given emissions cap. Thus, the expected social welfare W¯ has decreasing differences
in (β,E), so that the optimal E is decreasing in β. In other words, as innovation becomes
easier (β increases), it is optimal to impose a more ambitious emissions cap, i.e., E∗(β)
is decreasing in β (cf. Figure 2).
Example 2 Using the same values for µ, σθ, c, d, and e0 as in Example 1, we obtain an
optimal emissions cap of E∗0 ≈ 12.2 · 109 tCO2. Since µd ≈ 0.11 < 1, a carbon tax is
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Figure 2: Optimal Emissions Cap as a Function of β and d.
superior to a pure emissions cap in terms of expected welfare. Furthermore, with an
innovation effectiveness of β ≈ 0.167 · 10−3 (tCO2)2/$2, and a uniform distribution of
the macroeconomic uncertainty on [−δ, δ] (where δ = (10%) · e0), the optimal emissions
cap E∗(β) ≈ 11.38 · 109 tCO2 for λ = 0 (resp. E∗(β) ≈ 11.78 · 109 tCO2 for λ = 1) with
innovation is more ambitious than the optimal emissions cap E∗0 without innovation. ¤
Comparison between Pure Taxation and Basic Cap-and-Trade
The price fluctuations have a detrimental impact on social welfare compared to pure
taxation if environmental damages are small, i.e., when µd < 1. Indeed, as shown by
Weitzman (1974), the difference in optimal expected welfare levels,
W¯ ∗0,Tax − W¯ ∗0,Basic C&T = (1− µd)
σ2ε
2µ
,
favors a carbon tax over the basic cap-and-trade scheme if and only if µd < 1, i.e., if and
only if the slope of marginal environmental damages is small compared to the (average)
marginal abatement cost.14 With the introduction of innovation, i.e., when β > 0 and
small enough, the scales gradually tip towards quantity-based regulation, no matter what
the environmental damages. Let W¯ ∗Tax(β) and W¯
∗
Basic C&T(βˆ) be the optimal welfare under
a pure tax and an emissions cap, respectively.
14Strictly speaking, the expected marginal cost is
∫
Θ
(1/θ)dF (θ), which may vary somewhat from 1/µ,
which is relevant in the comparison with the slope of marginal environmental damages d.
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Proposition 3 (Pure Taxation vs. Basic Cap-and-Trade) (i) An increase in β in-
creases the relative attractiveness of quantity-based regulation over pure taxation, i.e.,
there exists a β¯ > 0 such that
0 < β < βˆ < β¯ ⇒ W¯ ∗Basic C&T(β)− W¯ ∗Tax(β) < W¯ ∗Basic C&T(βˆ)− W¯ ∗Tax(βˆ).
(ii) For large levels of innovation effectiveness, i.e., as β →∞, quantity-based regulation
strictly dominates pure taxation, so that 0 = W¯ ∗Basic C&T(∞) > W¯ ∗Tax(∞) = −dσ2ε/2.
With increasing innovation effectiveness abatement goes up and aggregate emissions tend
to zero under either of the two regulatory schemes. The intuition for part (i) of Proposi-
tion 3 is that while expected social welfare is increasing under both regulatory policies, the
increase is slower under pure taxation. With innovation firms perceive price uncertainty
as positive, as the upside to a higher price is a disproportionately larger benefit from
abating carbon and thus a higher expected return on innovation (the technical reason
being that firms’ payoffs are convex in the market price, which implies a preference for
increases in risk). In the extreme, a fixed carbon tax does not respond to the macroeco-
nomic uncertainty, which leads to residual emissions (or overabatement) and therefore to
positive environmental damages, whereas quantity-regulation forces aggregate emissions
to zero.
Remark 2 For any β, let W¯Tax(E; β) and W¯Basic C&T(τ ; β) be the expected welfare under
a pure-tax and a basic cap-and-trade scheme, respectively. The market-clearing condi-
tion (21) then implies that
max
E≥0
W¯Basic C&T(E; β) = max
τ≥0
E
[
W¯Basic C&T(e0 + ε˜− µτ
(
1 + βτ 2
)
; β)
∣∣ τ] .
Similarly, the relation between price and aggregate emissions output in Eq. (6) yields that
max
τ≥0
W¯Tax(τ ; β) = max
E≥0
E
[
W¯Tax(p(ε˜, E); β)
∣∣E] .
In other words, finding the optimal tax is equivalent to finding an emissions cap that
maximizes the expected welfare subject to market clearing (21), and finding the opti-
mal emissions cap is the same as optimizing the expected welfare subject to the output
relation (6).
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Figure 3: Cap-and-Trade with Price Controls.
3.3 Cap-and-Trade (with Price Controls)
Let us now consider the general case where the regulator can specify the general cap-and-
trade scheme R = (E,L, U) with price controls. Clearly, this scheme cannot perform worse
than any of the two regulatory policies considered above. The extant theoretical literature
has focussed on the effect of a price ceiling (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002; Pizer 2002),
which by Eqs. (18) and (19) reduces expected aggregate costs, but at the same time tends
to increase expected aggregate damages. The introduction of price ceilings therefore
tends to convert abatement-cost uncertainty into environmental-damage uncertainty. As
a result it may be optimal to increase or decrease the emissions cap, depending on how
fast marginal environmental damages increase. A price floor, on the other hand, tends to
increase the expected aggregate abatement cost and decrease expected aggregate damages,
and therefore produces a counterveiling effect on the optimal emissions cap.
Proposition 4 (Optimal Cap-and-Trade with Price Controls) (i) In the absence
of innovation, i.e., when β = 0, the optimal regulatory policy R∗ = (E∗0 , L
∗
0, U
∗
0 ) is deter-
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mined by
E∗0 =
e0
1 + µd
,
L∗0 = d ·
e0 + E [ε˜|ε˜ ≤ ε
¯
∗]
1 + µd
,
U∗0 = d ·
e0 + E [ε˜|ε˜ ≥ ε¯∗]
1 + µd
,
where the optimal uncertainty thresholds ε¯∗ = ε¯(E∗0 , U
∗
0 ) and ε¯
∗ = ε
¯
(E∗0 , L
∗
0) are given by
Eqs. (14) and (15), respectively. For parts (ii) and (iii), assume that the density of the
macroeconomic uncertainty ε˜ is nondecreasing on its support.15
(ii) With increasing innovation effectiveness β, the optimal emissions cap E∗(β) decre-
asses.
(iii) With increasing innovation effectiveness β, the optimal price controls L∗(β) and
U∗(β) tighten for small d and loosen for large d.
The workings of an optimal cap-and-trade market design with price controls as a function
of the macroeconomic uncertainty ε and aggregate emissions Q are illustrated in Figure 3.
For β = 0 (i.e., without innovation), the optimal emissions cap E∗0 is unaffected by the
optimal price controls and identical to the one determined earlier, in Section 3.2. The price
controls are symmetric to the marginal environmental damages dE∗0 if the distribution
of macroeconomic uncertainty is symmetrical. The width of the interval depends on
thickness of the tails of that distribution and on magnitude of the product µd. The latter
is also decisive in determining the tradeoff between pure taxation (µd < 1) and quantity-
based regulation (µd > 1), as analyzed before. With increases in µd, not only does the
regulator set a lower emissions cap, but also price controls are loosened around dE∗0 .
Part (ii) of the last result states, that, all else being equal, innovation always leads to a
more ambitious emissions target. In part (iii) of Proposition 4, it becomes evident that
the evolution of the price controls as a function of innovation effectiveness is somewhat
more complicated. First, the price cap and price always adjust to changes of β in opposite
directions, either tightening or widening the interval of admissible prices in the market
for carbon permits. Second, for small d price controls tighten with increasing β, i.e.,
15This condition is simple and sufficient; it is, e.g., for a uniform distribution of the macroeconomic
uncertainty on a compact support. Much less is required, as can be seen by inspecting the proof of
Proposition 4.
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Figure 4: Price Controls as a Function of Innovation Effectiveness β (for d Small/Large).
L∗(β) increases and U∗(β) decreases. Third, for large d, it is best for the regulator to
respond to an increase in β by relaxing price controls, so that L∗(β) decreases and U∗(β)
increases. Combining the last two points, we see that the sensitivity of the optimal
regulatory scheme to the magnitude of the slope of marginal environmental damages d
increases with increasing β (cf. Figure 4). This makes sense and directly corresponds to
the classical tradeoff by Weitzman. But this time it is related to the regulatory response
to innovation. Depending on the magnitude of the environmental damages, an increase
of innovation effectiveness may prompt a regulator to impose more or less price control,
a decision which becomes more sensitive to the magnitude of marginal environmental
damages.
Remark 3 Even for extremely large damage cost, the corresponding limits for the price
bounds are well-defined,
lim
d→∞
U∗0 =
e0 + E [ε˜|ε˜ ≥ ε¯]
µ
and lim
d→∞
L∗0 =
e0 + E [ε˜|ε˜ ≤ ε¯]
µ
.
Example 3 If the macroeconomic random shock ε˜ is uniformly distributed on [−δ, δ] for
some δ > 0, then in the absence of innovation the optimal carbon emissions cap is
E∗0 =
e0
1 + µd
,
while the optimal price controls are
U∗0 = d
(
e0
1 + µd
+
δ
2 + µd
)
and L∗0 = d
(
e0
1 + µd
− δ
2 + µd
)
.
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Figure 5: Complementarity Relationships in Social Cost SC = −W¯ .
Using the same values for µ, σθ, c, d, e0, and λ as in Example 1 and Example 2, in the
absence of innovation we obtain an optimal emissions cap E∗0 ≈ 12.2 · 109 tCO2 (as in
Example 2) with optimal price controls (L∗0, U
∗
0 ) ≈ (38, 42) $/tCO2. At an innovation
effectiveness of β ≈ 0.167 · 10−3 (tCO2)2/$2, and with δ = (10%) · e0 as in Example 2,
the optimal emissions cap becomes E∗(β) ≈ 11.5 · 109 tCO2 with the loosened price
controls (L∗(β), U∗(β)) ≈ (42.8, 48.6) $/tCO2, for λ = 0 (resp. E∗(β) ≈ 11.9 · 109 tCO2
and (L∗(β), U∗(β)) ≈ (37.2, 41.3) $/tCO2 for λ = 1). ¤
Comparative Statics Analysis
The proof of the last parts of Proposition 4 sheds further light on how the optimal regula-
tory scheme adjusts as some of its components are adjusted. In other words, the questions
we would like to answer now are of the sort, ‘what happens to the optimal price floor and
the optimal emissions cap when the price ceiling is changed?’ The latter adjustment may
be needed for political reasons or for harmonizing between different cap-and-trade schemes
in neighboring countries, despite the prima facie welfare losses in a single country.
As pointed out by Milgrom and Roberts (1990), based on earlier findings by Top-
kis (1968), among others, the monotonicity of optimal decisions (on lattices) critically
depends on the supermodularity properties of the objective function in the decision vari-
ables and parameters.16 Variable and/or parameter transformations may be used in case
supermodularity does not obtain under the initial problem parametrization (Strulovici and
Weber 2008). The latter turn out to be very simple in our context, as several simple sign
reversals are enough to establish supermodularity of each of the components (−C¯,−D¯,
and −K¯) of the expected social welfare W¯ .
16Milgrom and Shannon (1994) show that quasi-supermodularity of the objective function is a sufficient
(and in some sense necessary) condition for the monotonicity of solutions in parameters.
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Figure 6: Expected Market Price p¯∗(β) as a Function of Innovation Effectiveness β.
The complementarity relationships between the decision variables and innovation effec-
tiveness as well as marginal environmental damage, as determined by the sign of the cross-
partial derivatives, are summarized by the diagrams in Figure 5. We see that both −C¯
and −K¯ are supermodular (have positive cross-partial derivatives) in (E,−L,U,−β),
whereas −D¯ is supermodular in (E,L,−U,D). Thus, when expected damages dominate
in the social welfare, i.e., when d is large, then the monotone comparative statics obtain
according to the complementarity properties of D¯. When d is small, then the comple-
mentarity properties of C¯ determine the comparative statics. Figure 5 is also useful for
determining the direction of adjustments to the remaining policy instruments when one of
them is changed exogenously. For example, when the price ceiling U is decreased and the
slope of marginal environmental damage cost d is fairly large, then the optimal emissions
cap decreases (same direction as change in price cap, for the relation between E and U
in −D¯ has a positive sign, as indicated by the ‘+’ at the corresponding arrow) and the
optimal price floor increases (opposite direction compared to change in price cap, as the
relation between E and U in −D¯ has a negative sign).
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4 Policy Implications
A substantial private investment is needed to significantly reduce carbon emissions into
the atmosphere. Effective regulatory schemes therefore need to take into account not
only the firms’ emissions decisions, but also the return on their R&D investments. A
price floor guarantees a minimum return on innovation, whereas a price cap reduces the
volatility in the aggregate abatement cost. The last section has shown that changes in the
firms’ propensity to innovate are likely to have a profound impact on the optimal design
of carbon taxes as well as cap-and-trade markets, with or without price controls. It has
also made clear that a higher innovation effectiveness tends to increase the attractiveness
of cap-and-trade schemes vs. carbon taxes.17 This is due to the fact that when prices
increase, the substitution of emissions uncertainty for price uncertainty by imposing a
tighter quantity control serves as an additional innovation incentive, while when prices
decrease, the savings in abatement cost become so large that the regulator’s only worry
is the uncertainty in environmental damages, thus calling for quantity control.
The introduction of price controls in cap-and-trade markets, while superior to basic
cap-and-trade from a purely mathematical point of view, is subject to a number of political
considerations. First, the determination of a price cap in a political process is likely to lead
to substantial influence activities by affected parties during the course of the legislative
process, which may therefore produce price caps that are too low or price floors that are
too high in the form of ‘political compromises.’ Second, environmental damages depend
on aggregate carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions irrespective of their origin. This
implies the need for a coordinated response and therefore government intervention, and
international cooperation. A negative side-effect of price controls may be that they create
challenges for the harmonization of cap-and-trade schemes with different price controls,
and may even lead to arbitrage opportunities in cross-border trade of emissions permits.
Given the above caveats, what are the potential benefits of additional price controls?18
17Both taxes and cap-and-trade markets implement a price for carbon emissions, encouraging firms to
switch to low-carbon technologies and to develop better carbon-abatement technologies. They also both
raise funds (directly in the case of a carbon tax, indirectly using an emissions permit system) which can
be used to mitigate environmental damages or to help other countries achieve common emissions-control
targets.
18Indirect methods of ‘price stabilization,’ for example through the use of buffer stocks, were suggested
in great detail by Newbery and Stiglitz (1981). In this spirit, it may be possible to relax direct price
controls if one allows for emissions banking to create buffers moderating price fluctuations that would
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Price caps reduce expected aggregate costs as well as the social cost of innovation, as can
be seen directly from Eqs. (18) and (20). At the same time they tend to increase the
expected environmental damages. Decreasing an existing price cap decreases the optimal
emissions cap, as long as d is small. For large d, the opposite holds true. Thus, the degree
to which a more ambitious policy can be pursued by introducing a price cap depends
on the relative magnitude of the environmental damage cost. Price floors, on the other
hand, offer a government-backed minimum value for emissions permits. This encourages
innovation. Price floors also tend to reduce carbon-price volatility, thus increasing the
emissions volatility and therefore the expected environmental damage, all else being equal.
However, because of the higher innovation, it is to be expected that firms abate more
carbon than before, compensating for the increased in the environmental damages due to
the emissions-volatility increase.
5 Conclusion
In the absence of innovation, the classical Weitzman (1974) result states that under
uncertainty the relative magnitude of marginal abatement costs and marginal environ-
mental damage costs is crucial for deciding between tax-based or quantity-based policy
instruments. When marginal environmental damage cost d is larger than the (expected)
marginal abatement costs 1/µ, quantity-based regulation is preferable. The best instru-
ment aims to parallel the marginal welfare as a function of the uncertainty. Weitzman’s
classical framework allows only for one degree of freedom, either the choice of the emis-
sions cap or the choice of the carbon price. Introducing additional degrees of freedom
through price controls in a cap-and-trade market allows one first to replicate each of the
two simple schemes and then to improve welfare over both schemes.
We assume that firms can invest in innovation, and thus reduce the cost of mitigation
efforts. This enables them to mitigate more carbon at the same price of carbon. With
additional mitigation opportunities the marginal abatement cost is reduced. This shifts
the tradeoff between marginal abatement cost and marginal environmental damage cost.
The optimal emissions cap decreases in the innovation effectiveness. In the presence of
innovation we observe two additional results. First, carbon prices create incentives for in-
otherwise result from the shocks in BAU emissions levels driven by macroeconomic uncertainty. A multi-
period emissions-trading framework is needed to address this question.
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novation in mitigation technologies. A welfare-optimal carbon policy targets an emissions
level at which the innovation-enhanced marginal mitigation cost curve (considering ex-
pected innovation) intersects the damage cost curve that includes the additional benefits
from incentives for innovation. As a result, the carbon price in a world with innovation
can be higher than in a world without innovation. Second, the model shows that with
increasing innovation, price controls are tightened when marginal environmental damage
costs are low, and relaxed when these costs are large. Innovation creates mitigation op-
portunities that reduce the slope of the mitigation cost curve and therefore make the
optimal instrument look more like a cap (e.g. wider spreads).
In the current discussion on price caps and floors, the analysis focuses often on static
models. Including additional dimensions can materially alter the results. For example,
the potential for innovation can increase the level at which caps and floors are set. We
note that the analysis in this paper neglected several global effects of price caps, such
as the question of what happens when they are set in a world of uncertain fuel and
technology prices. The political debate surrounding price controls as additional policy
instruments is complex. For example, Pizer (2002), among others, pointed out that price
caps can increase the likelihood of governments accepting more stringent targets. On the
other hand, price caps, through implicit borrowing from future periods, may reduce the
incentive for governments or private companies to comply with emissions targets and can
subsequently increase incentives to deviate from longer-term emissions targets so as to
reduce the cost of debt. Additional models are required to examine such effects in greater
detail.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Let R = (e0, τ, τ). The corresponding expected social
welfare,
W¯ (τ ; β) = −µ
2
(
1 + βτ 2
)
τ 2 − d
2
[
σ2ε +
(
e0 − µτ
(
1 + βτ 2
))2]− λ µβτ 4
4
,
is strictly concave in the tax level τ . In the absence of innovation it is β = 0, so that
W¯ (τ ; 0) = −µτ
2
2
− d
2
[
σ2ε + (e0 − µτ)2
]
,
and the unique optimal tax becomes τ ∗0 = de0/(1 + µd). (ii) For β > 0, the optimal
tax τ ∗(β) is determined by the first-order necessary optimality condition W¯τ (τ ∗(β); β) =
0.19 Differentiating this condition implicitly with respect to β yields
dτ ∗(β)
dβ
= −W¯τβ(τ
∗(β); β)
W¯ττ (τ ∗(β); β)
.
Since W¯ττ (τ
∗(β); β) < 0 at the welfare-maximizing tax level, the optimal tax τ ∗(β) is
decreasing if and only if W¯τβ(τ
∗(β); β) < 0. Combining
W¯τβ(τ ; β) = µτ
3
[
3de0
τ
− 2 (1 + µd (2 + 3βτ 2))+ λ]
with the fact that by the first-order condition
de0
τ
=
1 + (2 + λ)βτ 2 + µd(1 + βτ 2)(1 + 3βτ 2)
1 + 3βτ 2
,
we obtain that W¯τβ < 0 if and only if
µd >
1− λ
(1 + 3βτ 2)2
.
(iii) Since limβ→∞ W¯τ (τ ; β)/β2 = −3µ2dτ 5 = 0 at the optimal tax τ = τ ∗(∞), we must
have that τ ∗(∞) = 0, i.e., the optimal tax converges to zero as perfect abatement becomes
free, which concludes our proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Let R = (E, 0,∞). The expected social welfare in this
case is
W¯ (E; β) = −E
[
µ
2
(
1 + βp2(ε˜, E)
)
p2(ε˜, E) +
dE2
2
+
λµβp4(ε˜, E)
4
]
,
19By Abel’s well-known impossibility theorem (see, e.g., Hungerford 1974, p. 308) a closed-form solution
for τ∗(β) cannot be expected.
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where p(ε, E) = p0(ε, E) − ∆(p0(ε, E), β) as in Eq. (12). In the absence of innovation,
i.e., for β = 0, it is
W¯ (E; 0) = −(e0 − E)
2
2µ
− dE
2
2
− σ
2
ε
2µ
,
strictly concave in E, leading to a unique optimal emissions cap of E∗0 = e0/(1 + µd).
(ii) For β > 0, the optimal emissions cap E∗(β) is implicitly determined by the first-order
necessary optimality condition
W¯E(E
∗(β), β) = 0. (23)
Differentiating Eq. (23) on both sides with respect to β, we obtain that
dE∗(β)
dβ
= − W¯Eβ(E
∗(β); β)
W¯EE(E∗(β); β)
.
By differentiating the market-clearing condition (21) it is
pE = − 1
µ
1
1 + 3βp2
, (24)
pβ = − p
3
1 + 3βp2
, (25)
and
pEβ =
3p2
µ
1 + βp2
(1 + 3βp2)3
, (26)
so that
W¯Eβ(E
∗(β); β) = µE
[−(λ+ 2µ) (p3 + 3βp2pβ) pE − (λ+ 2µ)βp3pEβ − pβpE − ppEβ]
= E
[
(−4− 3βp2 + (2µ+ λ)(1− β2p4)) p3
µ(1 + 3βp2)3
]
< 0
for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and all µ > 0 (with p = p(ε˜, E∗(β))). Since W¯EE(E∗(β); β) < 0 at
the welfare-maximizing emissions cap, the fact that W¯Eβ < 0 implies that the optimal
emissions cap E∗(β) is decreasing. (iii) Note first that p(∞) = 0, i.e., the market price for
carbon vanishes for β → ∞, which is obtained by taking the corresponding limit in the
market-clearing condition (21). Thus, taking the limit in the first-order condition (23)
implies that E∗(∞) = 0, which concludes our proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Given any β > 0, let W¯Tax(τ ; β) and W¯Basic C&T(E; β) be
the expected welfare for a pure tax of τ and an emissions cap of E, respectively. At the
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optimal levels τ ∗(β) and E∗(β), an application of the envelope theorem yields that
d
dβ
(
W¯ ∗Tax(β)− W¯ ∗Basic C&T(β)
)
=
µ
2
(
1− λ
2
) (1 + (2+λ2−λ) βτ 2) τ 4
1 + 3βτ 2
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=τ∗(β)
− E
[ (
1 +
(
2+λ
2−λ
)
βp˜2
)
p˜4
1 + 3βp˜2
∣∣∣∣∣ p˜ = p(ε˜, E∗(β))
])
,
where W¯ ∗Tax(β) = W¯Tax(τ
∗(β); β), W¯ ∗Basic C&T(β) = W¯Basic C&T(E
∗(β); β), and p(ε˜, E∗(β)) =
p0(ε˜, E
∗(β)) − ∆(p0(ε˜, E∗(β)), β) as in Eq. (12). Taking the limit for β → 0+ on both
sides of the last equation, we obtain
d
dβ
∣∣∣∣
β=0
(
W¯ ∗Tax(β)− W¯ ∗Basic C&T(β)
)
=
µ
2
(
1− λ
2
)(
(τ ∗0 )
4 − E [(p0(ε˜, E∗0))4]) < 0,
since τ ∗0 = E [p0(ε˜, E∗0)] by Eq. (22), and E [p0(ε˜, E∗0)] < E
[
(p0(ε˜, E
∗
0))
4] by Jensen’s
inequality (as long as there exists nontrivial macroeconomic uncertainty ε˜, so that σε > 0).
From the continuity of the derivative of W¯ ∗Tax(β)− W¯ ∗Basic C&T(β) we can therefore conclude
that there exists a β0 > 0, such that
d
dβ
(
W¯ ∗Tax(β)− W¯ ∗Basic C&T(β)
)
< 0
for all β ∈ (0, β0). (ii) By taking the limit for β → ∞ in Eq. (16) we obtain that
∆(p0,∞) = p0 for any p0. Hence, Eq. (12) implies that
lim
β→∞
p(ε, E∗(β)) = lim
β→∞
(p0(ε, E
∗(β))−∆(p0(ε, E∗(β)), β)) = 0
for all ε. Thus, using part (iii) of Proposition 2 together with Eq. (13) and the market-
clearing condition (21), it is
lim
β→∞
p0(ε, E
∗(β)) = µ lim
β→∞
β (p(ε, E∗(β)))3 = e0 + ε
for all ε. Therefore,
lim
β→∞
β(p(ε, E∗(β)))4 =
(
lim
β→∞
β(p(ε, E∗(β)))3
)(
lim
β→∞
p(ε, E∗(β))
)
= 0,
which implies (after a legitimate switch of limit and integration) in Eqs. (18)–(20) (for R =
(E∗(β), 0,∞)) that
lim
β→∞
W¯ ∗Basic C&T(β) = 0.
On the other hand, by part (iii) of Proposition 1 it is τ ∗(∞) = 0, so that, using Eqs. (18)
and (20), the social cost of innovation and aggregate abatement cost are zero. The
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key difference of pure taxation is that as innovation effectiveness goes to infinity, the
(deterministic!) optimal tax level approaches zero, and at the same time the aggregate
abatement approaches e0, so that, using Eqs. (6) and (17), the aggregate emissions output
becomes
lim
β→∞
Q(τ ∗(β), ε) = lim
β→∞
(
e0 + ε− µτ ∗(β)
(
1 + β(τ ∗(β))2
))
= ε
for all ε. Expected aggegrate environmental damages are therefore equal to −dσ2ε/2, so
that
lim
β→∞
W¯ ∗Tax(β) = −
dσ2ε
2
< 0 = lim
β→∞
W¯ ∗Basic C&T(β),
which concludes our proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) we first consider the situation without innovation, where β =
0 and where W¯ (R; 0) is the expected social welfare without innovation. Using the Leibniz
rule, we obtain the first-order necessary optimality condition
∂W¯ (R; 0)
∂E
=
∫ ε¯
ε
¯
(
1
µ
(e0 + ε− E)− dE
)
dG(ε) = 0,
which is equivalent to
E∗0 =
e0 + E [ε˜|ε
¯
≤ ε˜ ≤ ε¯]
1 + µd
.
Similarly, we obtain
∂W¯ (R; 0)
∂U
=
∫ ∞
ε¯
(−µU + µd(e0 + ε− µU)) dG(ε) = 0,
which is equivalent to
U∗0 = d ·
e0 + E [ε˜|ε˜ ≥ ε¯]
1 + µd
,
and, analogously,
L∗0 = d ·
e0 + E [ε˜|ε˜ ≤ ε
¯
]
1 + µd
.
(ii),(iii) We examine the supermodularily properties of the expected welfare W¯ = −C¯ −
D¯ − K¯ for each of its components. Consider first
C¯(R; β) =
µ
2
∫ ∞
−∞
(
1 + βp2(ε, R)
)
p2(ε,R) dG(ε),
with
C¯β(R; β) =
µ
2
∫ ε¯
ε
¯
(
2(1 + 2βp2)ppβ + p
4
)
dG(ε),
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where pβ is given in Eq. (25). Using Eqs. (24)–(26), we therefore find that
C¯βL = −µ
2(1 + 4βL2)L7G′(ε
¯
)
1 + 3βL2
< 0 <
µ2(1 + 4βU2)U7G′(ε¯)
1 + 3βU2
= C¯βU ,
and
C¯βE = 2
∫ ε¯
ε
¯
(1 + 3βp2 + 3β2p4)p3
(1 + 3βp2)3
dG(ε) +
µU4(1 + 4βU2)G′(ε¯)
1 + 3βU2
− µL
4(1 + 4βL2)G′(ε
¯
)
1 + 3βL2
.
Since, by hypothesis, the macroeconomic uncertainty is nondecreasing on its support, it
isG′(ε
¯
) ≤ G′(ε¯). Furthermore, it is easy to show that the function µx4(1+4βx2)/(1+3βx2)
is strictly increasing in x > 0, so that indeed C¯βE > 0. In addition, C¯LU = 0, C¯EU =
−µU(1+2βU2)G′(ε¯) < 0 < µL(1+2βL2)G′(ε
¯
) = C¯EL, which implies that C¯ is submodular
in (E,−L,U,−β). Consider now
K¯(R; β) =
λµβ
4
∫ ∞
−∞
p4dG(ε),
so that
K¯β(R; β) =
λµ
4
∫ ∞
−∞
p4dG(ε) + λµβ
∫ ε¯
ε
¯
p3pβdG(ε).
Using Eqs. (24)–(26), it is therefore
K¯βU = − λµ
2βU9
1 + 3βU2
< 0 <
λµ2βL9
1 + 3βL2
= K¯βL
and
K¯βE = −λ
(∫ ε¯
ε
¯
(1− 3β2p4)p3
(1 + 3βp2)3
dG(ε) +
L3G(ε
¯
)
1 + 3βL2
+
U3(1−G(ε¯))
1 + 3βU2
)
< 0.
In addition, K¯LU = K¯EL = K¯EU = 0, so that we have shown that K¯ is submodular
in (E,−L,U,−β). Lastly, consider
D¯(R; β) =
d
2
∫ ε¯
ε
¯
E2dG(ε) +
d
2
∫ ε
¯
−∞
(
e0 + ε− µL
(
1 + βL2
))2
dG(ε)
+
d
2
∫ ∞
ε¯
(
e0 + ε− µU
(
1 + βU2
))2
dG(ε),
so that
D¯β(R; β) = −µd
[
L3
∫ ε
¯
−∞
(
e0 + ε− µL(1 + βL2)
)
dG(ε)
+U3
∫ ∞
ε¯
(
e0 + ε− µU(1 + βU2)
)
dG(ε)
]
= −µd
[
L3
∫ ε
¯
−∞
(E + ε− ε
¯
) dG(ε) + U3
∫ ∞
ε¯
(E + ε− ε¯) dG(ε)
]
.
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Thus, we find
D¯βL = µd(1−G(ε
¯
))L2
[
3 (E + E [ ε˜| ε˜ ≤ ε
¯
]− ε
¯
)− µL(1 + 3βL2)(1 + EG′(ε
¯
))
]
> 0,
D¯βU = −µd(1−G(ε¯))U2
[
3 (E + E [ ε˜| ε˜ ≥ ε¯]− ε¯)− µU(1 + 3βU2)(1 + EG′(ε¯))] < 0,
and
D¯βE = µd
[
U3G′(ε¯)− L3G′(ε
¯
)
]
> 0.
Moreover, D¯LU = 0, and D¯EL = −dEG′(ε
¯
) < 0 < dEG′(ε¯) = D¯EU , which, together
with the previous inequalities, implies that D¯ is submodular in (E,L,−U,−β). Hence,
for small damages W¯ is supermodular in (E,−L,U,−β), and for large damages W¯ is
supermodular in (E,L,−U,−β). This implies that E∗(β) is decreasing. Second, for small
environmental damages, L∗(β) is increasing and U∗(β) is decreasing (i.e., more stringent
price control). Third, for high environmental damages, L∗(β) is decreasing and U∗(β) is
increasing (i.e., less stringent price control). ¥
References
[1] Arrhenius, S. (1896) “On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the
Temperature of the Ground,” Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science (Fifth
Series), Vol. 41, pp. 237–276.
[2] Ballard, C.L., Shoven, J.B., Whally, J. (1985) “General Equilibrium Com-
putations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States,” American
Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 1, pp. 128–138.
[3] Baumol, W.J., Oates, W.E. (1988) The Theory of Environmental Policy, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
[4] Bovenberg, A.L., de Mooij, R.A. (1994) “Environmental Levies and Distor-
tionary Taxation,” American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 4, pp. 1085–1089.
[5] Carraro, C., Galeotti, M., Gallo, M. (1996) “Environmental Taxation and
Unemployment: Some Evidence on the ‘Double Dividend Hypothesis’ in Europe,”
Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 62, No. 1–2, pp. 141–181.
[6] Coase, R. (1960) “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics,
Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 1–44.
31
[7] Crocker, T.D. (1966) “The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Sys-
tems,” in: Wolozin, H. (Ed.) The Economics of Air Pollution, Norton, New York,
NY, pp. 61–86.
[8] Dales, J.H. (1968) Pollution, Property, and Prices, University of Toronto Press,
Toronto, Canada.
[9] Edenhofer, O., Lessman, K., Kemfert, C., Grubb, M., Ko¨hler, J. (2006)
“Induced Technological Change: Exploring its Implications for the Economics of
Atmospheric Stabilization,” Energy Journal, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 57–122.
[10] Enkvist, P.-A., Naucle´r, T., Rosander, J. (2007) “A Cost Curve for Green-
house Gas Reduction,” McKinsey Quarterly, February, pp. 35–45.
[11] Fell, H., MacKenzie, I.A., Pizer, W.A. (2008) “Prices versus Quantities ver-
sus Bankable Quantities,” Discussion Paper 08-32-REV, Resources for the Future,
Washington, DC.
[12] Fullerton, D. (2001) “A Framework to Compare Environmental Policies,” South-
ern Economic Journal, Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 224–248.
[13] Goulder, L.H., Mathai, K. (2000) “Optimal CO2 Abatement in the Presence of
Induced Technological Change,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 1–38.
[14] Goulder, L.H., Schneider, S.H. (1999) “Induced Technological Change and the
Attractiveness of CO2 Abatement Policies,” Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 21,
No. 3–4, pp. 211–253.
[15] Goulder, L.H., Parry, I.W.H. (2008) “Instrument Choice in Environmental
Policy,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 152–174.
[16] Grubb, M. (1997) “Technologies, Energy Systems and the Timing of CO2 Emissions
Abatement,” Energy Policy, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 159–172.
[17] Hart, R. (2008) “The Timing of Taxes on CO2 Emissions when Technological
Change is Endogenous,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 194–212.
32
[18] Hepburn, C., Grubb, M., Neuhoff, K., Matthes, F., Tse, M. (2006) “Auc-
tioning of EU ETS Phase II Allocations: How and Why?” Climate Policy, Vol. 6,
No. 1, pp. 135–158.
[19] Hicks, J. (1932) The Theory of Wages, Macmillan, London, UK.
[20] Hoel, M., Karp, L. (2001) “Taxes versus Quotas for a Stock Pollutant with Mul-
tiplicative Uncertainty,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 82, No. 1, pp. 91–114.
[21] Hungerford, T.W. (1974) Algebra, Springer, New York, NY.
[22] IEA (2008) World Energy Outlook, International Energy Agency, Paris, France.
[23] IPCC (2008) Climate Change 2007 – Mitigation of Climate Change: Working
Group III Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK.
[24] Ismer, R., Neuhoff, K. (2006) “Commitments Through Financial Options: A
Way to Facilitate Compliance with Climate Change Obligations,” EPRG Working
Paper 06/25, Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.
[25] Kennedy, C. (1964) “Induced Bias in Innovation and the Theory of Distribution,”
Economic Journal, Vol. 74, No. 295, pp. 541–547.
[26] Laffont, J.-J. (1977) “More on Prices vs. Quantities,” Review of Economic Studies,
Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 177–182.
[27] Larson, D.F., Ambrosi, P., Dinar, A., Rahman, S.M., Entler, R. (2008)
“Carbon Markets, Institutions, Policies, and Research,” Policy Research Working
Paper, World Bank, Washington, DC.
[28] Lo¨schel, A. (2002) “Technological Change in Economic Models of Environmental
Policy: a Survey,” Ecological Economics, Vol. 43, No. 2–3, pp. 105–126.
[29] Margolis, R.M., Kammen, D.M. (1999) “Evidence of Under-Investment in En-
ergy R&D in the United States and the Impact of Federal Policy,” Energy Policy,
Vol. 27, No. 10, pp. 575–584.
[30] McKibbin, W.J., Wilcoxen, P.J. (2002) “The Role of Economics in Climate
Change Policy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 107–129.
33
[31] Milgrom, P.R., Roberts, J. (1990) “The Economics of Modern Manufacturing:
Technology, Strategy, and Organization,” American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 3,
pp. 511–528.
[32] Milgrom, P., Shannon, C. (1994) “Monotone Comparative Statics,” Economet-
rica, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 157–180.
[33] Missfeldt, F., Hauff, J. (2004) “The Role of Economic Instruments,” in: Owen,
A.D., Hanley, N. (Eds.) The Economics of Climate Change, Routledge, New York,
NY, pp. 115–146.
[34] Montero, J.-P. (2002) “Price versus Quantities with Incomplete Enforcement,”
Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 435–454.
[35] Montgomery, W.D. (1972) “Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control
Programs,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 395–418.
[36] Newbery, D.M.G., Stiglitz, J.E. (1981) The Theory of Commodity Price Sta-
bilization, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK.
[37] Newell, R., Pizer, W.A. (2003) “Regulating Stock Externalities under Un-
certainty,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 45, No. 2
(Suppl. 1), pp. 416–432.
[38] Nordhaus, W.D. (1973) “Some Skeptical Thoughts on the Theory of Induced In-
novation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87, No. 2, pp. 208–219.
[39] Nordhaus, W.D. (1977) “Economic Growth and the Climate: the Carbon Dioxide
Problem,” American Economic Review, Vol. 67, No. 1, pp. 341–346.
[40] Nordhaus, W.D. (2007) “To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing
Global Warming,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1,
pp. 26–44.
[41] Parry, I.W., Williams, R.C. (1999) “A Second-Best Evaluation of Eight Policy
Instruments to Reduce Carbon Emissions,” Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 21,
No. 3–4, pp. 347–373.
34
[42] Pearce, D.W. (1991) “The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warming,”
Economic Journal, Vol. 101, No. 407, pp. 938–948.
[43] Pindyck, R.S. (2007) “Uncertainty in Environmental Economics,” Review of En-
vironmental Economics and Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 45–65.
[44] Philibert, C. (2008) “Price Caps and Price Floors in Climate Policy: A Quantita-
tive Assessment,” International Energy Agency, Paris, France.
[45] Pigou, A.C. (1920) The Economics of Welfare, Macmillan, New York, NY.
[46] Pizer, W.A. (2002) “Combining Price and Quantity Controls to Mitigate Global
Climate Change,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 409–434.
[47] Roberts, M.J., Spence, A.M. (1976) “Eﬄuent Charges and Licenses under Un-
certainty,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 5, No. 3–4, pp. 193–208.
[48] Rothchild, M., Stiglitz, J.E. (1971) “Increasing Risk: I. A Definition,” Journal
of Economic Theory, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 225–243.
[49] Samuelson, P.A. (1965) “A Theory of Innovation Along Kennedy-Wei[z]sa¨cker
Lines,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 343–356.
[50] Sue Wing, I. (2003) “Induced Technical Change and the Cost of Climate Policy,”
Technical Report No. 102, Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
[51] Stavins, R.N. (1989) “Harnessing Market Forces to Protect the Environment,”
Environment, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 5–7, 28–35.
[52] Stavins, R.N. (1995) “Transaction Costs and Tradable Permits,” Journal of Envi-
ronmental Economics and Management, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 133–148.
[53] Stavins, R.N. (1996) “Correlated Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice,”
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 218–232.
[54] Stern, N. (2007) The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK.
35
[55] Strulovici, B., Weber, T.A. (2008) “Monotone Comparative Statics: Geomet-
ric Approach,” Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 137, No. 3,
pp. 641–673.
[56] Tol, R.S.J. (2005) “The Marginal Damage Costs of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An
Assessment of the Uncertainties,” Energy Policy, Vol. 33, No. 16, pp. 2064–2074.
[57] Topkis, D. (1968) Ordered Optimal Solutions, Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford Uni-
versity, Stanford, CA.
[58] Tyndall, J. (1861) “On the Absorption and Radiation of Heat by Gases and
Vapours, and on the Physical Connexion of Radiation, Absorption, and Conduc-
tion,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 151, pp. 1–36.
[59] von Weizsa¨cker, C.C. (1966) “Tentative Notes on a Two Sector Model With
Induced Technical Progress,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 245–
251.
[60] Weitzman, M.L. (1974) “Prices vs. Quantities,” Review of Economic Studies,
Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 477–491.
[61] Weitzman, M.L. (1978) “Optimal Rewards for Economic Regulation,” American
Economic Review, Vol. 68, No. 4, pp. 683–691.
36
